Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have great potential for numerous domains of application because of their ability to sense and understand unattended environments. However, a WSN is subject to various attacks due to the openness of the public wireless channel. erefore, a secure authentication mechanism is vital to enable secure communication within WSNs, and many studies on authentication techniques have been presented to build robust WSNs. Recently, Lu et al. analyzed the security defects of the previous ones and proposed an anonymous three-factor authenticated key agreement protocol for WSNs. However, we found that their protocol is vulnerable to some security weaknesses, such as the o ine password guessing attack, known session-speci c temporary information attack, and no session key backward secrecy. We propose a lightweight security-improved three-factor authentication scheme for WSNs to overcome the previously stated weaknesses. In addition, the improved scheme is proven to be secure under the random oracle model, and a formal veri cation is conducted by ProVerif to reveal that the proposal achieves the required security features. Moreover, the theoretical analysis indicates that the proposal can resist known attacks. A comparison with related works demonstrates that the proposed scheme is superior due to its reasonable performance and additional security features.
Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is an intelligent network that can achieve data collection, data fusion, and data transmission independently. It combines the logical information world and the real physical world together closely to realize the "ubiquitous computing" mode [1] [2] [3] . A WSN comprises many tiny sensor nodes, which have limited battery power and computation capability, and they can be deployed in untended target elds, such as habitats [4] , health care [5] , agriculture [6] , battle elds [7] , and environmental monitoring [8] .
ese nodes sense the environment, collect data from the surrounding areas, and transmit them to the closest gateway node (GWN) via wireless channels for further transferring to external users. us, WSNs have wide application scenarios, such as city management, emergency medical care, temperature and humidity monitoring in agriculture, wildlife monitoring, antiterrorism, military defense, and so on. However, the messages transmitted in the wireless channel are easily eavesdropped, injected, rerouted, and altered by an adversary because of the broadcast nature and insecurity of wireless communication. Although the WSN has adequate security progress in its lower layers, such as link layer and network layer [9, 10] , it is still necessary to design mutual authentication schemes with key agreement in the application layer to prevent unauthorized access to the sensor node. As shown in Figure 1 , authentication mechanisms should be provided to protect the secure communication between related parties in a WSN.
In addition, traditional security service architectures, such as IPsec [11] and IKE [12] , are not suitable for WSNs because the sensors in a WSN have limited battery power and computation capability. Consequently, the authentication with key establishment between sensors and the user outside the WSN should have lightweight computation and should be robust enough to withstand well-known attacks from adversaries. In other words, it is vital that the user should be authenticated before he is permitted to access the remote sensor to acquire data, and the sensor to be accessed should be an authorized one. In particular, a shared session key should be generated between the sensor and the user to protect the data transmission. Moreover, users likely prefer to keep their identity and other privacy undisclosed to avoid being tracked by adversaries when they communicate with the sensors in a WSN.
us, the user's anonymity and untraceability are desirable security properties in the authentication scheme in WSNs.
Related Works.
In the last several years, many authentication schemes have been presented to prevent unauthorized access to transmitted data within WSN from malicious users or adversaries. Li-Xiong [13] , Chen et al. [14] , and Ramachandran-Shanmugam [15] proposed mutual authentication schemes on bilinear pairing for WSN and generated a session key among the related parties. However, employing bilinear pairing makes the computation burden very heavy, and thus, these schemes are not practical for WSNs.
In 2006, Wong et al. [16] proposed a user authentication scheme with hash function and exclusive-or (XOR) operation for WSNs. In their scheme, the user submits his identity and password to a system interface and directly accesses the sensor within the expiration time. However, Tseng found that Wong's scheme was vulnerable to the replay attack, stolen veri er attack, and impersonation attack and then put forward a modi ed version while adding a new password change phase to solve the problem of the static password [17] . Generally, the security of the type of scheme [16, 17] only depending on the single factor of password easily leads to password guessing attack.
To address the above security issues, Das [18] rst put forward the concept of two-factor authentication, that is, using a smart card along with a password. ere is no doubt that Das's scheme [18] introduced the authentication concept of two-factor, removing the need to maintain a database on the gateway and store user-speci c information on the sensor, thus paving a new way of application layer authentication for WSNs. e author claimed that his scheme has the security merits of only using hash function, requiring less communication overhead and resisting various attacks. However, several researchers [19] [20] [21] analyzed Das's scheme [18] and found that it had various loopholes. Nyang and Lee [19] found that Das's protocol [18] was vulnerable to the o ine password guessing attack, and sensor node capture attack, and presented an improved version to overcome these weaknesses. In the same year, Huang et al. [20] examined Das's scheme [18] for weaknesses such as the inability to provide user anonymity and withstand sensor impersonation attack. Huang et al. [20] also proposed an enhanced scheme to repair the pitfalls in Das's scheme [18] . Later, He et al. [21] pointed out that Das's scheme [18] su ered from insider attack along with impersonation attack. As a countermeasure to these drawbacks, He et al. [21] presented an enhanced protocol to thwart these threats. However, Kumar and Lee [22] observed that He et al.'s protocol [21] failed to provide mutual authentication and could not generate a shared session key between the sensor and the user. Moreover, there have been many schemes [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] settling the security weaknesses in the two-factor authentication protocols for WSNs. In these schemes, the authors cryptanalyzed the previous schemes, found some vulnerabilities in them, and presented a new improved twofactor scheme as a remedy. Unfortunately, Wang et al. [30, 31] criticized that most of these solutions and the similar two-factor authentication schemes were found to be vulnerable to various practical attacks that could lead to unintended consequences.
To overcome the security weakness in two-factor authentication schemes for WSNs and further improve their security strength, plenty of three-factor-based authenticated key agreement schemes have been proposed in the past few years [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] . In the three-factor schemes, a user is identi ed as a legal one only if his smart card, password, and biometric information are valid. Compared with the traditional authentication methods, biometrics has the following advantages [39] : (1) biometrics cannot be lost, forgotten, or forged; and (2) a biometric key is di cult to guess or breach. In this section, we briefly describe the schemes closest to our work. In 2014, Das [33] came across the privileged insider attack, improper authentication, and inefficiency in Jiang et al.'s scheme [40] and proposed a three-factor user authentication protocol for WSNs with symmetric cryptographic primitives. In the next year, Das also presented another two three-factor schemes for WSNs [34, 35] . However, Wu et al. [41] pointed out that these three schemes are vulnerable to offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack, and destitution of strong forward security and proposed an enhanced one. Unfortunately, we found that if the user enters an incorrect password during the login phase in Wu et al.'s scheme [41] , the smart card will not check whether the password is correct, and the protocol will proceed until GWN finds that the user's login request was invalid, thereby unnecessarily wasting precious computation resource of the user and the GWN.
In 2016, Amin et al. [38] reviewed Farash et al.'s authenticated key agreement scheme [42] for heterogeneous WSN and found that Farash et al.'s scheme [42] cannot withstand offline password guessing attack, known sessionspecific temporary information (KSSTI) attack, and user impersonation attack. To overcome these pitfalls, Amin et al. [38] proposed a secure improved three-factor scheme and claimed that their new scheme was secure enough to resist the known threats. However, Jiang et al. [36] proved that Amin et al.'s scheme [38] was insecure to smart-card-loss attack defined by [43] , KSSTI attack, and tracking attack. As a remedy, Jiang et al. [36] built an improved three-factor user authentication scheme on the Rabin cryptosystem for WSN. We observe that Jiang et al.'s scheme [36] is skeptical to privileged insider attack because GWN also generates the session key which means GWN can decrypt all of the session messages between the user and the sensor. In 2017, Wang et al. [44] identified weaknesses (offline dictionary attack, impersonation attack, etc.) in previous ones, and proposed an enhanced anonymous three-factor user authentication protocol employing an elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) for WSN. Owing to the fuzzy verifier, their scheme can withstand the offline identity and password guessing attack. Unfortunately, their scheme is vulnerable to insider attack because the random number chosen by GWN for the user is stored in GWN's database, and the insider can access and modify it, resulting in user login failure. Moreover, their scheme is subject to KSSTI attack, which is similar to the analysis in Section 4.4. In 2018, Li et al. [45] introduced a three-factor authenticated scheme for WSNs in Internet of ings environments with adoption of fuzzy commitment to handle the user's biometric information. However, we discovered that their scheme fails to provide three-factor security if the lost/stolen smart card is obtained by the attacker and the biometric information is also collected by the attacker without the awareness of the owner, so their scheme is not as secure as they claimed. With a similar reason, schemes of [46] [47] [48] fail to provide true three-factor security. Although Li et al. employed fuzzy verifier technique and claimed that their protocol [49] for wireless medical sensor networks satisfies many security features, we found that it cannot resist replay attack.
In 2015, Das [35] proposed an efficient biometric-based authentication scheme for WSNs using smart card and demonstrated that the scheme can resist various attacks. However, Lu et al. [50] criticized that Das's scheme [35] has security weaknesses including lack of three-factor security along with user anonymity and user impersonation attack. To eliminate the security drawbacks, Lu et al. [50] proposed a new three-factor solution on ECC and claimed that their scheme was secure against the known attacks. Furthermore, their scheme has been equipped with a formal security proof in random oracle model, and thus they have full confidence in the security of their scheme.
In this paper, we examine the scheme of Lu et al. [50] and show that it cannot provide three-factor security along with a lack of strong session key security, suffers from KSSTI attack, and is unsuitable to the WSN environment. To overcome the security pitfalls found in Lu et al.'s scheme, we present an improved scheme and prove its security under random oracle model and heuristic security analysis. Moreover, we use the formal verification tool ProVerif to demonstrate that the improved scheme fulfills session key secrecy and mutual authentication. A comparison with other related schemes shows that our scheme is superior to theirs.
Our Contribution.
Motivated by the thought of overcoming the security vulnerabilities in Lu et al.'s scheme [50] , we present a new secure three-factor authentication scheme exploiting ECC in the WSN context. In short, our main contributions are summarized as follows:
(i) First, we cryptanalyze Lu et al.'s protocol [50] and show its security weaknesses. (ii) Second, we propose a new lightweight anonymous three-factor authentication and key agreement protocol on ECC for WSN. e proposal not only overcomes the security weaknesses in Lu et al.'s protocol, but also achieves more security features than the related competitive works. (iii) ird, we use the random oracle model to demonstrate the validity of the proposed scheme, and we conduct a formal verification by using ProVerif. Additionally, a performance comparison is made between our scheme and the related three-factor authentication schemes to show that it provides a better tradeoff between performance and security requirements, thereby making it more suitable for practical application in WSN environments.
Security Requirements.
To design a robust and efficient three-factor authenticated scheme for WSNs, the following security requirements should be fulfilled.
(1) Provide three-factor security: the scheme should still be secure even if any two of the three factors are compromised. (2) Attack resistance: the scheme should be secure against various attacks, such as user impersonation attack, gateway node impersonation attack, sensor impersonation attack, KSSTI attack, replay attack, privileged insider attack.
(3) Forward and backward secrecy: if the long-term secret key is compromised, the attacker cannot compute the previous session and the future ones. (4) Resistance to sensor capture attack: if a single sensor is captured by the attacker, it is difficult for he/she to pretend to be any noncompromised sensors. (5) User anonymity: any attackers are incapable of revealing the identity of the user, and it is also an important privacy protection requirement for users. (6) Mutual authentication and key agreement: the user and the sensor should authenticate each other and generate a shared session key.
Organization of the Paper.
e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the preliminaries of the fuzzy extractor and related mathematical assumptions. We review and cryptanalyze Lu et al.'s scheme in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Section 5 presents our new three-factor authenticated key agreement protocol for WSNs. Next, the validity of our scheme and the security analysis are demonstrated in Section 6, and the formal security verification via ProVerif is given in Section 7. Section 8 shows the performance comparison with the related studies. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 9.
Preliminaries

Fuzzy Extractor.
e fuzzy extractor was introduced by Dodis et al. [51] in 2004, it is mainly used to address the issue of biometric templates authentication, and many protocols use this technology [32, [52] [53] [54] to improve their security. e fuzzy extractor can produce a biological key δ i and a public parameter τ i from the user's biometric template Bio by utilizing certain error-correcting code technology. To recover δ i , the reproduction algorithm is applied to τ i and the other newly captured biometric template Bio * , which is similar to Bio. By comparing the similarity of the stored biometric template and the captured biometric template, the protocol can achieve biometric authentication with error tolerance. According to [51] , the fuzzy extractor is given by two effective algorithms (Gen, Rep) which are defined as follows:
Gen is a probabilistic generation algorithm. When the biometric template Bio is input, Gen will output a random string δ i with an auxiliary random string τ i . Rep (Bio * , τ i ) � δ i : Rep is a deterministic reproduction algorithm. Upon receiving a biometric template Bio * within an error-tolerant range and the auxiliary random string τ i , Rep will recover δ i .
Mathematical Assumption.
Let E p (a, b) be a set of elliptic curve points over the prime field F p , which is defined by the equation style of y 2 mod p � (x 3 + ax + b) mod p, with a, b ∈ F p , 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p ≠ 0. An elliptic curve group G is defined on E/F p with generator P. For simplicity, mod p is omitted in the following section. In this section, we briefly describe two important mathematical assumptions [55] that rely on the elliptic curve and are closely related to our scheme.
Elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) problem: given Q, P ∈ G, it is infeasible to find the integer a ∈ [1, p − 1] such that Q � aP.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: given (P, aP, bP) for any a, b ∈ [1, p − 1], it is infeasible to calculate abP ∈ G.
Review of Lu et al.'s Scheme
Lu et al.'s three-factor authenticated scheme [50] consists of seven phases, i.e., predeployment, user registration, sensor node registration, login, authentication and key agreement, password change, and dynamic sensor node addition. e last two phases are omitted since they are not relevant. For convenience, the notations used in this paper are listed in Table 1 .
Predeployment
(1) GWN computes K j � h (SID j , X GWN ) shared with each S j (2) GWN stores K j into S j 's memory and then deletes X GWN
User Registration
(1) U i inputs his ID i and password PW i , imprints his biometrics Bio, and then computes Gen
stores it in a smart card, where K is a nonce. en, GWN sends the smart card to U i via a secure channel.
Gen (), Rep (), h ()) on the smart card.
Sensor Node Registration
(1) S j sends {SID j } to GWN (2) GWN computes h (SID j , K j ) and sends it to S j via a secure channel (3) S j stores h (SID j , K j ) in its memory
Login
(1) U i inserts his smart card into a card reader, enters (ID i , PW i ) and imprints biometrics Bio * . (2) e smart card computes Rep (Bio * , τ i ) and checks whether h
, a i P, T 1 ); and then sends
Otherwise, the smart card rejects the login request.
Authentication and Key Agreement
, and verifies whether sk′ � sk holds. If it holds, U i believes that he has shared a session key sk with S j . Otherwise, U i aborts this session.
Cryptanalysis of Lu et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we discuss the security weaknesses of Lu et al.'s scheme [50] , which include failure to provide threefactor security, no backward secrecy, and vulnerability to KSSTI attack. Before cryptanalyzing Lu et al.'s scheme [50] , we summarize the adversarial model used in this paper based on [38] as follows:
(1) e attacker has full control of the communication channel between the related participants. In other words, the attacker might eavesdrop, intercept, insert, delete, and modify messages transmitted over the public channel. (2) When the smart card is lost, stolen, or somehow obtained by an attacker, he/she could extract all of the secret data stored on the smart card by launching a differential power attack [56] or side-channel attacks [57, 58] . Furthermore, the attacker might compromise two of the three factors (i.e., password and smart card, password and biometrics, or smart card and biometrics), but he is incapable of compromising all of the three factors. (3) e attacker can learn the user's identity as far as the attacks (e.g., impersonation attack) and security properties (e.g., mutual authentication and session key agreement) are concerned. (4) e attacker can guess the user's identity and password offline by choosing a pair (ID, PW) from the Cartesian product D ID × D PW in polynomial time, where D ID denotes identity space and D PW denotes the password space [31, 59] . (5) e random nonce and the secret key selected by communication parties are adequately large to prevent the attacker from successfully guessing these data in polynomial time.
Failure to Provide ree-Factor Security.
Generally, an authentication protocol providing three-factor security means that an attacker can launch impersonation attacks only if he learns all of the three factors (password, biometrics, and smart card). Lu et al. claimed that their protocol can provide three-factor security and withstands various attacks. Unfortunately, we found that if the lost/ stolen smart card is obtained by the attacker and the biometrics of the user are also obtained by the attacker without the awareness of the owner, the attacker could perform the identity and password offline guessing attack resulting in failure to provide the privacy preservation and security properties as they claimed. e attacker carries out the attack as follows.
(1) e attacker extracts the secret data {RPW i , f i , τ i , Gen(), Rep(), h ()} from the smart card by performing side-channel analysis attack [57, 58] (2) With the user's biometric template Bio * and τ i as input, the attacker recovers δ i by computing Rep (Bio * , τ i ) (3) e attacker selects a pair (ID * i , PW * i ) from D ID × D PW randomly and verifies whether
If it is false, the attacker repeats step 3∼4 until the correct pair (ID * i , PW * i ) is found e running time of the above attack is O (|D ID | * | D PW | * 2T h ), where |D ID | and |D PW | denote the number of items in D ID and D PW , respectively, and in reality, |D ID | ≤ | D PW | ≈ 10 6 [60, 61] ; T h denotes the computing time of a hash function. Furthermore, because T h is almost negligible, the required time of this attack is linear to |D ID | * | D PW |. In practice, the attacker can offline guess the correct pair (ID * i , PW * i ) from D * ID × D * PW within polynomial time [43] . With the disclosure of the user's identity and password, Lu et al.'s scheme [50] cannot preserve user privacy and other security features as they claimed. erefore, Lu et al.'s protocol fails to provide three-factor security. [50] , if an attacker has disclosed the identity ID i through the offline guessing attack mentioned above and captures the message
, where the session key sk generated by sensor S j is identical to the one generated by the user. us, the attacker is able to learn all the subsequent session keys between the user and the sensor once he obtains U i 's identity. e root cause of this weakness is that the message verifier is only dependent on U i 's identity. Naturally, the attacker will make use of it to obtain the subsequent session keys of the U i .
KSSTI Attack.
For the authentication protocol, if the session key is generated with ephemeral secret information, such as random numbers provided by each party, and it is secure even though this transient information is compromised, we can say that this protocol is secure against KSSTI attack. In Lu et al.'s protocol, the session key sk � h (a i b j P), where a i and b j are random numbers chosen by the user and the sensor, respectively. Once the ephemeral information a i and b j are disclosed by the attacker, he can compute the session key easily. erefore, Lu et al.'s protocol [50] cannot withstand KSSTI attack.
Inapplicability to the WSN Environment.
A WSN consists of many sensors that are deployed in unattended fields to continuously monitor the surroundings. As we pointed out earlier, the sensor node is small in size with limited battery power and computation capability as well as a short communication range. According to the communication experiments of the sensor reported in [62] , the power consumption increases proportionally with the increase in the distance between the sensor and the communication participant. erefore, reducing power consumption is an important problem for sensor nodes in communication to prolong their life cycle, and it is a reasonable solution that the messages exchanged between U i and S j should use GWN as a bridge. However, from the concrete authentication procedures described in Lu et al.'s scheme [50] , we can see that the S j delivers messages to U i directly. Obviously, the distance from the user is far beyond the communication range of the sensor. erefore, Lu et al.'s scheme [50] is inapplicable to the WSN environment.
The Proposed Protocol
In this section, we develop an improved three-factor authentication scheme with key agreement to overcome the security weaknesses existing in Lu et al.'s scheme. Meanwhile, our protocol employs ECC without bilinear pairing to reduce the computation cost while maintaining security strength in WSN environment. Our scheme consists of four phases, i.e., predeployment, user registration, login and authentication, and password update.
First, the GWN chooses a large prime number p and generates an elliptic curve E/F p and an additive cyclic group G over E/F p with a generator P. After that, GWN selects a private key x g and a secure one-way hash function h (). Finally, GWN selects an integer t ∈ [2 4 , 2 8 ] as the parameter of the fuzzy verifier. A detailed description of the proposed scheme is as follows.
Predeployment
(1) GWN chooses a unique identity SID j for each sensor and calculates
User Registration
(1) U i inputs his ID i , PW i , imprints his biometric Bio, and computes Gen (Bio) � (δ i , τ i ). After that, U i selects a random number r i and computers
, and then he sends
Login and
Authentication. e following steps are performed if U i intends to access the WSN:
(1) U i inputs ID i and PW i , inserts the smart card and imprints his biometrics Bio * . e card computes
and checks whether f * i � f i holds. If it is false, the smart card rejects U i 's login request. Otherwise, the card chooses two random number r new i and e i , chooses a login-sensor node SID j , and computes PID new
(2) U i selects a random number a i , and the timestamp
(3) On receiving M 1 , GWN checks the validity of T 1 . If it is false, GWN aborts the session; otherwise, GWN
. GWN will terminate this session if m 5 ′ ≠ m 5 . Otherwise, it selects a timestamp T 2 , and computes K j � h(SID * j || X GWN ),
Security and Communication Networks (4) After receiving M 2 from GWN, S j will reject the session if T 2 is invalid; otherwise, S j computes e k ′ � h (SID j || K j ), and decrypts m 6 to obtain (e i , PID new i ). Next, S j computes m 7 ′ � h (K j || PID new i || SID j || m 2 || T 2 ) and checks whether m 7 ′ � m 7 holds. If it is incorrect, S j stops the session; otherwise, S j chooses a random number b j and computes m 8 
. e login and authentication phase is shown in Table 2 . U i keys ID i and the old password PW i , imprints biometrics Bio * , and inserts the smart card into a reader. en, the smart card computes Gen (
and checks whether f i ′ � f i holds. e session is aborted if the condition is false.
Security Analysis
In this section, we first conduct a formal security analysis under the random oracle model [63] and then provide an informal security analysis to demonstrate that our improved scheme can withstand various attacks and meet the security requirement in WSNs.
Formal Security Analysis.
is section justifies our security analysis of our lightweight user authentication and key agreement protocol for WSNs. For the sake of simplicity, we follow the security model in [63] to conduct our formal security proof. Theorem 1. Assume that Adv AKE P,D (A) denotes the advantage of the attacker A in cracking the security of the improved protocol P and that Adv CDH A (t) denotes the advantage of the attacker A in solving the CDH problem in polynomial time t, and the attacker asks at most q s Send queries, q e Execute queries, q h Hash queries. en, we have
where l s represents the security parameter, which also represents the length of the random number and hash value; n, D PW , |D PW |, l b , ε, and T m represent the order of the elliptic curve group G over E/F p , a password dictionary with a frequency distribution following Zipf's law [64] , the size of password dictionary D PW , the length of BIO i , the probability of a "false positive" event, and the execution time of a point multiplication in G, respectively.
Proof. A series of games Gm i (0 ≤ i ≤ 5) are defined to demonstrate that our improved scheme is provably secure. In each game Gm i , S i (0 ≤ i ≤ 5) denotes the event that the attacker guesses a correct bit in the Test query, and Pr[S i ] denotes the corresponding probability.
Gm 0 : this game is considered to perform in a real attack scenario under random oracle model. us, we have 
Gm 2 : in this game, collisions of random oracle queries are considered. e simulation will be aborted if collision occurs on the hash oracle and transcripts M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 , and we let the attacker win. According to the birthday paradox, the collision probability on the hash oracle is q 2 h /2 l s +1 at most, the collision probability of random nonces a i and b j is (q s + q e ) 2 /n − 1, and the 4 to the attacker and checks whether M 1 ∈L P holds. us, the total collision probability is (3q h /2 l s ) + (q s /2 n ). 
attacker and checks whether M 2 ∈L P holds. us, the collision probability is (3q h /2 l s ) + (q s /2 n ) at most. us, the collision probability is (2q h /2 l s ) + (q s /2 n ) at most. As a whole, we have
Gm 4 : in this game, the attacker encounters the CDH problem. If it is possible for the attacker to use Corrupt query to get the session key, it means that the attacker can find a solution for the CDH problem and (b j a i P || PID new i || SID j || e i ) ∈ L A holds. It is necessary for the attacker to obtain the smartcard to breach the session key because the simulation will terminate if the attacker gets only PW i and BIO i . us, the game can be demonstrated as having three cases:
e attacker asks Corrupt (U i μ , 2) to guess PW i within password space D PW with at most q s Send queries. e possibility is q s /|D PW |.
Case 2.
e attacker asks Corrupt (U i μ , 0) and chooses one of the following approaches to obtain BIO i : (a) e attacker guesses BIO i with at most q s Send queries. e possibility is q s /2 l b , where l b is the length of BIO i . (b) e attacker asks Send queries with his own biometrics to try the probability of a "false positive". e possibility of this event is ε.
It is noted that the attacker can ask at most two Corrupt (U i μ , ω) ω ∈ {0,1,2}, and the above two cases cannot occur concurrently. us, the possibility of the above three cases is 
Gm 5 : in this game, the strong forward security is considered. e attacker asks Corrupt (U i μ \GWN λ \S j ] ) after simulating a Test query, the two indexes of which are chosen from {1, 2, . . ., q s + q e }. If the Test query cannot return the session key with the ith instance of U i and the jth instance of S j , the game will terminate. us, we have
Taking all of the games into account, the attacker has no advantage in guessing the correct bit b, and thus we have
Combining equations (2)-(8) together, the theorem is proved.
Analysis of Security.
We show that our enhanced scheme not only overcomes the vulnerability in Lu et al.'s scheme [50] but also withstands various attacks in this section.
6.2.1.
ree-Factor Security. ree-factor security means that the user can access the sensor data only when he has learned the password, smart card, and biometrics. at is, if the attacker has any two factors, he is incapable of mounting an impersonation attack. We will discuss that the enhanced scheme satisfies this security feature in three aspects.
Case 1. Suppose the attacker has the user's smart card and password.
Assume that the attacker extracts the secret data
To masquerade as the user to log into GWN, the attacker calculates r i
However, the attacker fails to verify the correctness of ID i and cannot recover δ i due to the lack of the user's biometrics. us, the attacker cannot construct a correct f i ′ to log into GWN.
Case 2. Suppose that the attacker has the user's smart card and biometrics. e attacker could also reveal the secret data {A i , B i , f i , τ i , h (), Gen (), Rep ()} from the smart card and recovers δ i by calculating Rep (Bio, τ i ). Afterwards, the attacker tries to guess ID i and PW i , calculates r * i � B i ⊕ h (ID i || δ i || PW i ), and then checks whether f * i � h (h (PW i || r * i || δ * i ) mod t) holds. However, he will not succeed because there are |D ID | * | D PW |/t 2 32 candidates of (ID i , PW i ) (where |D PW | � |D ID | � 10 6 and t � 2 8 ) [59, 65] . en, if the attacker directly enters a pair of (ID i , PW i ) and sends a login request to GWN to test the correctness of (ID i , PW i ), the smart card will reject his/ her request if the number of login requests exceeds the threshold and his/her dream will not come true.
Case 3. Suppose that the attacker has the user's biometrics and password.
Undoubtedly, the attacker could not derive δ i by computing Rep (Bio, τ i ), where the auxiliary string τ i is stored on the smart card. e attacker can also intercept the message
. If the attacker attempts to find some clues about τ i in M 1 , his wish will not come true because none of the elements in M 1 have a direct relationship with τ i . erefore, it is infeasible for the attacker to impersonate a legitimate user to log into GWN.
Resistance to GWN Impersonation Attack.
In the proposed scheme, the attacker is unable to masquerade as GWN to communicate with U i or S j . If the attacker intends to masquerade as GWN to S j , he first intercepts the message M 2 � {m 2 , m 6 , m 7 , T 2 } in the public channel. However, it is impossible for him to forge m 6 because m 6 is encrypted with the symmetric key h (SID j || K j ), where K j is the secret key to S j and the attacker has no knowledge of it. On the other hand, to impersonate as GWN to U i , it is necessary for the attacker to generate a valid message M 4 � {m 8 , m 9 , m 11 , m 12 ,
, which requires verification of m 10 and m 12 . However, it is infeasible because the attacker has no knowledge of PID new i , e i and K j . erefore, our improved scheme can resist the GWN impersonation attack.
Resistance to Sensor Impersonation
Attack. If the attacker intends to impersonate a sensor S j to communicate with GWN, he/she has to forge a valid message M 3 � {m 8 , m 9 , m 10 , T 3 }, which is embedded with b j , K j , e i , and PID new i to cheat GWN. However, the attacker is unable to obtain these secret parameters since they are protected carefully by the communication parties. erefore, our improved scheme can resist the sensor impersonation attack.
6.2.4.
Resistance to KSSTI Attack. In Lu et al.'s protocol, the security of the session key h (a i b j P) depends on the ephemeral random numbers a i and b j , which are generated by U i and S j , respectively. Naturally, the transient leakage of a i and b j will bring about the compromise of their session key. In the improved scheme, the session key SK � h (b j m 2 || PID new i || SID j || e i ), where m 2 � a i P. It is worth noting that SK relies not only on a i and b j , but also on K j , e i , and PID new i . Further, to obtain PID new i , the attacker needs to learn (ID i , Bio, r new i , e i ), where (r new i , e i ) will be different in every authentication session. Hence, it is difficult for the attacker to disclose these secret ephemeral random numbers to calculate the session key. erefore, the proposed protocol can thwart KSSTI attack.
Provision of Perfect Forward and Backward Secrecy.
As shown in the login and authentication phase, the session key SK S-U � h (b j m 2 || PID new i || SID j || e i ) is calculated by S j and SK U-S � h (a i m 8 || PID new i || SID j || e i ) is calculated by U i . As analyzed above, the session key is related to (a i , b j , PID new i , SID j , e i ), where (a i , b j , r new i , e i ) is generated randomly and unpredictably. Even if GWN's long-term secret key x g is compromised by the attacker and he/she obtains m 2 and m 8 , it is infeasible for the attacker to calculate the session key because he/she heads to resolve the ECDL problem and CDH problem to obtain a i b j P from m 2 (� a i P) and m 8 (� b j P) .
us, the proposed protocol can provide perfect forward and backward secrecy.
6.2.6. Resistance to Replay Attack. It is generally true that timestamp mechanism is employed to overcome replay attack. However, addressing time synchronization is quite difficult in a large-scale network. It is noteworthy that time synchronization issue should not take place in a WSN since a WSN could be deployed in specific areas. e proposed protocol exploits the timestamp technique to prevent replay attack. When an attacker intercepts the login message M 1 � {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 , m 5 , PID i , T 1 } and replays it to the receiver, he will fail because the receiver will check the freshness of timestamp and verify the hash value, which is calculated with a secret value e i shared between the sender and the receiver. Furthermore, if the attacker constructs a forgery message with a new timestamp, e. g, M 1 ′ � {m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 , m 5 , PID i , T 1 ′ } under a new timestamp T 1 ′ , it is easily detected by verifying the hash value m 5 because T 1 is a parameter of m 5 . erefore, the proposed protocol is secure against replay attack.
Resistance to Privileged Insider Attack.
e insider attack implies that the system insider can directly access user's password that is stored in GWN and impersonates the user to log into other systems and enjoy their services. In the proposed protocol, the user only submits {ID i , PID i } to GWN in the registration phase. us, the insider cannot get the user's password information. erefore, our scheme can overcome privileged insider attack.
Resistance to Sensor Capture Attack.
Suppose that if a sensor node S j has been captured physically by the attacker, he/she can compromise the identity SID j and secret number K j from the memory of the sensor. However, it is infeasible for the attacker to guess GWN's secret key X GWN successfully in relation K j � h (SID j || X GWN ) in light of item 5 in the adversarial model described in Section 4. at is, if a single sensor is captured by the attacker, it is impossible for him/ her to break the confidentiality during sessions between the user U i and other noncaptured sensors. erefore, the proposed scheme can withstand sensor capture attack.
Resistance to Many Logged-In Users with the Same
Login-ID Attack. In the proposed protocol, to log into GWN, U i has to input his (ID i , PW i ), imprint his biometric Bio, and insert his smart card into the card reader. Assume that users U i and U j have the same identity and password.
for U j are distinct since δ * i and δ * j are generated by a fuzzy extractor with different biometrics. As a result, the proposed scheme can resist many logged-in users with the same login-ID attack.
6.2.10. Resistance to Man-in-the-Middle Attack. In our protocol, GWN verifies m 5 to authenticate U i , S j verifies m 7 to authenticate GWN, GWN verifies m 10 to authenticate S j , and U i verifies m 12 to authenticate GWN and verifies m 9 to authenticate S j , respectively. erefore, our scheme can provide mutual authentication and withstand the man-in-the-middle attack.
6.2.11. User Anonymity and Untraceability. Assume that the attacker intercepts all of the exchanged messages between the related parties during the execution of the protocol and attempts to reveal U i 's identity. In our protocol, U i 's identity is included in m 4 � (ID i || SID j ) ⊕ h(PID i || e i ) where PID i is transmitted in the public channel. If the attacker wants to get the user's ID i , he/she has to compute e i � m 1 ⊕ h (PID i || x g ). It is infeasible because GWN's secret key x g is protected carefully by GWN and cannot be guessed successfully according to Item 5 in the adversarial model described in Section 4. Another way to obtain U i 's identity is to guess ID i from PID i � h (ID i || δ i || r i ), which is also impossible because the attacker knows little about the user's biometric and random nonce r i . erefore, our scheme can withstand tracking attack and achieves untraceability property.
Formal Security Verification via ProVerif
is section presents the formal security verification of the proposed protocol by using the Pi calculus-based simulation tool ProVerif [66] . e researchers used this tool to test an authentication protocol and see whether the adversary is capable of compromising the session key, since ProVerif makes use of the Dolev-Yao model and implements many cryptographic primitives, such as symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption, signature, hash function, etc. So far, many protocols have been verified by ProVerif to demonstrate their correctness and robustness properties [66] . In this section, we use ProVerif to rectify the secrecy and authentication properties of our protocol.
First, we define the following channels. Channels sch1 and sch2 are used for secure communication between U i and GWN and between S j and GWN, respectively. Meanwhile, channels ch1 and ch2 are used for public insecure communication between U i and GWN and between S j and GWN, respectively. In particular, we define four events to test the mutual authentication between U i and S j as follows: event beginSj (bitstring). event endSj (bitstring). event beginUi (bitstring). event endUi (bitstring).
According to the proposed protocol execution, we define the process of U i as follows: let process U i � new PWi:bitstring; let (delta_i:bitstring, tau_i:bitstring) � Gen (Bio) in new ri: bitstring; let PID i � h (con3 (IDi, delta_i, ri)) in out (sch1, (IDi, PID i )); let fi � h (mod (h (con3 (PWi, ri, delta_i)),t)) in in (sch1, xCi:bitstring); let Ai � xor (xCi, fi) in let Bi � xor (h (con (con (IDi, delta_i),PWi)), ri) in ! ( event beginUi (IDi); let delta_i′ � Rep (Bio′,tau_i) in let ri′ � xor (Bi, h (con3 (IDi, delta_i, PWi))) in let fi′ � h (mod (h (con3(PWi, ri′,delta_i′)),t)) in if fi′ � fi then new ri_new:bitstring; new ei:bitstring; let PIDi_new � h (con3 (IDi, delta_i′,ri_new)) in let e process of GWN is modeled as follows: let processGWN � in (sch1, (xIDi:bitstring, xPIDi: bitstring)); let Ci � h (con (xPIDi, x_g)) in let Kj � h (con (SIDj, X_GWN)) in out (sch2, (SIDj, Kj)); out (ch1, Ci); ! ( in (ch1, (m 1 ′:bitstring, m 2 ′:bitstring, m 3 ′:bitstring, m 4 ′: bitstring, m 5 ′:bitstring, PIDi′:bitstring, T 1 ′:bitstring)); let ei′ � xor (m 1 ′,h (con (PIDi′,x_g))) in let PID i _new′ � xor (m 3 ′, h (ei′)) in let (IDi′:bitstring, SIDj′:bitstring) � xor (m 4 ′, h (con (PIDi′,ei′))) in let m 5 g � h (con (con5 (IDi′,PIDi′,PIDi_new′, m 2 ′, SIDj′),T 1 ′ )) in if m 5 ′ � m 5 g then new T 2 :bitstring; let ek � h (con (SIDj, Kj)) in let m 6 � syme (con (ei′,PIDi_new′),ek) in let m 7 � h (con5 (Kj, PIDi_new′,SIDj, m 2 ′, T 2 )) in out (ch2, (m 2 ′, m 6 , m 7 , T 2 )); Ours e whole protocol is simulated as executing in parallel as follows:
process !processUi | !processGWN | !processSensor e outputs of the ProVerif verification are as follows:
(1) RESULT not attacker (SKu_s[]) is true.
(2) RESULT not attacker (SKs_u[]) is true.
(3) RESULT inj-event (endSj (id)) � �> inj-event (beginSj (id)) is true. (4) RESULT inj-event (endUi (id_18)) � �> inj-event (beginUi (id_18)) is true.
Results (1) and (2) indicate the secrecy of the proposed scheme because of the failing query attack on session key SK S-U and SK U-S . Moreover, results (3) and (4) confirm the successfully mutual authentication between U i and S j . In other words, the proposed scheme not only provides the secrecy of the session key, but also achieves the authentication property by verifying the correspondence assertions in the Dolev-Yao model.
Performance and Security Comparisons
To evaluate the proposed scheme, we compare the performance and security with related schemes [26, 29, 41, 44, 45, 49, 50] in the login and authentication phase.
To compare computation cost fairly, we use the time cost of cryptographic calculations in [41] as the benchmark, which is shown in Table 3 . e execution time of XOR and the concatenation operation is ignored because their computation cost is very trivial. In addition, we assume that the length of an identity, a hash value, a random nonce, and a timestamp are 32 bits, 160 bits, 128 bits, and 32 bits, respectively, and the prime p in E p (a, b) is 160 bits (the 160 bit ECC has a security strength equivalent to that of a 1024 bit RSA [67] ). In AES symmetric encryption/decryption, the block size of plaintext/ciphertext is 128 bits [68] . e performance comparison of our scheme and the related ones [26, 29, 41, 44, 45, 49, 50] is summarized in Table 4 . It is worth noting that although scheme in [50] is not suitable for WSN environment, we still compare it as a related scheme to determine whether our scheme can maintain better performance while overcoming its security defects.
In Table 4 , we can see that (1) the computation time of our scheme is slightly higher than that of protocols [26, 29, 41, 45] and much lower than that of protocols [44, 49, 50] and (2) the communication overhead of our scheme is slightly lower than that of protocol [29] and higher than that of the others. Meanwhile, from Table 5 , it is evident that our scheme fulfills all of the security features, while other protocols suffer from some security weaknesses more or less. Specifically, our protocol overcomes the security pitfalls of Lu et al.'s protocol [50] . Compared with Li et al.'s protocol [45] , our scheme makes use of the ECDL and CDH problem on ECC to enhance security, and thus, our protocol consumes more computation cost and needs more communication overhead. It is worth noting that security is the most important factor to be considered in cryptography protocols. us, it is worthwhile to gain a higher security level at the cost of a slightly increased computation cost or communication overhead. Although our protocol is not the most efficient one in performance compared with schemes [26, 29, 41, 44, 45, 49, 50] , the security analysis in Section 6 has demonstrated that the proposed scheme thwarts security threats in [26, 29, 41, 44, 45, 49, 50] . In a word, the proposal provides a better tradeoff between performance and security requirements and is more suitable for practical application in WSN environments.
Conclusion
Although many three-factor mutual authentication schemes have been presented for the WSN environment, most of F: feature. F1: provide three-factor security. F2: resistance to user impersonation attack. F3: resistance to GWN impersonation attack. F4: resistance to sensor impersonation attack. F5: resistance to KSSTI attack. F6: perfect forward and backward secrecy. F7: resistance to replay attack. F8: resistance to privileged insider attack. F9: resistance to sensor capture attack. F10: resistance to many logged-in users with the same login-ID attack. F11: resistance to man-in-the-middle attack. F12: user anonymity. F13: mutual authentication and key agreement.
them have been found to be unprotected from various attacks or lacking in functionality properties. In this paper, we have analyzed Lu et al.'s scheme and show its security defects of their scheme. To overcome these defects, we have proposed a lightweight secure three-factor authentication scheme for WSNs. Furthermore, we propose a security analysis, and show that the proposed protocol is secure against known security attacks, and address the vulnerability in Lu et al.'s scheme. e formal security proof of the proposal is proved under the random oracle model. Security verification is confirmed by the formal proof through ProVerif. A performance comparison between our scheme and the related recent ones in terms of computation cost and communication overhead demonstrates that our scheme offers a better tradeoff between security and efficiency. Based on these advantages, we believe that our scheme provides a reasonable lightweight solution for authentication in the WSN environment.
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